A society that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation-or that tolerates discrimination by its members-is not a JUST society. 
of the Solomon Amendment by carefully downplaying First Amendment precedent and overemphasizing irrelevant cases. The decision in FAIR is a shocking example of the Court's approval of unrestrained military power. Inexplicably, the Court was able to reach its unanimous decision without the government having offered even a shred of factual evidence that the Solomon Amendment is an effective method of recruitment, which would have proven that the means chosen were in some way tailored to the government interest. From the Court's decision in FAIR, it appears that government regulations can pass constitutional muster when the government simply holds up the flag of military power. As Justice Antonin Scalia posited during oral arguments, 'Judicial deference is at its apogee when [Congress acts] to raise and support armies . . . [a] nd that's precisely what we have here." 6 This Note explores and critiques the Supreme Court opinion in FAIR In Part I, it discusses the historical background of the case, including the development of the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, AALS' non-discrimination policy, and the passage of the Solomon Amendment. Part II discusses FAIR in detail, including the district court's decision, the legal reasoning supporting the circuit court's opinion, and the Supreme Court's opinion. Part III outlines the doctrinal flaws in the Court's conclusion and reasoning, specificially its reliance on irrelevant and outdated caselaw and its downplaying of important and relevant precedent. Finally, Part IV outlines how, paradoxically, one of the flaws in the Court's opinion may actually be beneficial to the continued mission of FAIR.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: WHAT'S THE BIG DEAL?
The First Amendment issues in FAIR arose out of conflicting policies between law schools and the federal government. The Solomon Amendment requires universities and law schools to provide access to military recruiters. Further, the U.S. military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy excludes openly homosexual people from serving in the military. AALS members have a longstanding commitment to anti-discrimination within their own institutions and by potential future employers who wish to interview on their campuses. This section examines these conflicting policies that led to FAIR's First Amendment challenge to the Solomon Amendment.
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense. (b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Id. This law was originally enacted in 1956. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 74. Under it, gays were barred outright from the military and prosecuted if found to have committed sodomy. Of course, many gays served without disclosing to anyone that they were gay. Thus, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" did not really change the law and actually has proved to be extremely dangerous for the men and women serving who identify as, or are suspected of being, gay.
9 Jeffrey Schmalz, A Delicate Balance: The Gay Vote; Gay Rights and AIDS Emerging As Divisive Issues in Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1992, at Al. 10 The President's News Conference: Gays in the Military, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 108, 109 (Jan. 29, 1993) .
11 Id. To determine the best way to go about allowing gays in the military, Clinton ordered the Department of Defense and a private research group to each conduct a study. Id. Both studies determined that total inclusion of out gays would be detrimental to the military. The study conducted by the Department of Defense firmly concluded that "all homosexuality is incompatible with military service." OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP 7 (1993). The
Military Working Group's (MWG) report included several findings of note. First, it found that there is "no right to serve" in the military and that "(u)ltimately, the military's mission is to fight and win the nation's wars." Id. at 1. Second, combat effectiveness would be greatly harmed by the inclusion of gays because their presence would invade heterosexual soldiers' privacy, polarize and fragment units, and effectively destroy the bonding that is essential to effective combat. Id. at 5-6. Further, the MWG found that since the homosexual lifestyle has been "clearly documented as being unhealthy," having active homosexuals in the military could "bring an increased incidence of sexually transmitted diseases." Id. at 6. The MWG also predicted that inclusion of homosexuals would create problems with recruitment and retention, Tell" essentially gives gay servicemembers the "choice" of remaining in the closet or risking discharge for homosexual conduct. I " It is the only law in the United States that blatantly authorizes firing someone for his or her sexual orientation. 14 The results of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" have been drastic and have led to increased rates of discharge, sexual harassment, assaults, and even murder. 5 The most recent deadly attack occurred at Fort Campbell in Kentucky and highlights the destructive effects of the suspicion and secrecy resulting from "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." On July 5, 1999, fellow soldiers of Barry Winchell, a Private in the 101st Airborne Division, murdered him in his sleep because they suspected he was gay.' 6 The Department of Defense reported that 80% of servicemembers have heard derogatory anti-gay remarks in 2003, and 37% said that they witnessed or experienced targeted incidents of anti-gay harassment. 17 Further, since the law was codified, discharge rates under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" have continued to rise from 617 in 1994 to 1273 in 2001. 18 In fact, the U.S. armed forces have discharged over 10,000 servicemembers due to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" since its enactment, costing the Department of Defense approximately $281 million dollars.' 9 Finally, the regulations that accompany "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" are so harsh that many activists call them "witch hunts." 20 They are essentially guidelines for determining whether soldiers are homosexual and explaining how to discharge them if they are found to be gay.
2 1 Several memoranda within the Department of ber has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex.
Id. 13 
Id.
14 See SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEF.
NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE, DON'T HARASS" 13 (2004).
15 See generally id.
16 Servicemembers Legal Def. Network, Historical Timeline of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue, Don't Harass" (2004) , http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDN_ ARTICLES/pdf file/1451 .pdf.
17 SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEF. NETWORK, supra note 14, at 7. 18 Id. at 1.
19 Id. at 2 (see graph). 20 Id.
21 DEP'T OF DEF. DIPEcrvE No. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS 68 (1993) . The Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries into Homosexual Conduct, found at Attachment 4 to Enclosure 3 (E3.A4.3), give the following "Bases for Conducting Inquiries:" 1. A commander will initiate an inquiry only if he or she has credible information that there is a basis for discharge. Credible information
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Defense have further outlined how the servicemembers' commander is supposed to go about investigating sexuality. One such memo from Richard A. Peterson, Deputy Chief of the Judge Advocate General's (JAG) General Law Division, instructed investigators to question "parents, siblings, school counselors, and close friends of suspected gay servicemembers." 2 2 As if the regulations were not degrading enough, they conclude by stating that after being suspected of being homosexual, "the Service member bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
23
This effectively shifts the burden to the servicemember to prove that he or she is "innocent."
exists when the information, considering its source and the surrounding circumstances, supports a reasonable belief that there is a basis for discharge. It requires a determination based on articulable facts, not just a belief or suspicion.
A basis for discharge exists if: (a)
The member has engaged in a homosexual act; (b) The member has said that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or made some other statement that indicates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts; or (c) The member has married or attempted to marry a person of the same sex. 3. Credible information does not exist, for example, when: (a) The individual is suspected of engaging in homosexual conduct, but there is no credible information, as described, to support that suspicion; or (b) The only information is the opinions of others that a member is homosexual; or (c) The inquiry would be based on rumor, suspicion, or capricious claims concerning a member's sexual orientation; or (d) The only information known is an associational activity such as going to a gay bar, possessing or reading homosexual publications, associating with known homosexuals, or marching in a gay rights rally in civilian clothes. Such activity, in and of itself, does not provide evidence of homosexual conduct. 4. Credible information exists, for example, when: (a) A reliable person states that he or she observed or heard a Service member engaging in homosexual acts, or saying that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual or is married to a member of the same sex; or (b) A reliable person states that he or she heard, observed, or discovered a member make a spoken or written statement that a reasonable person would believe was intended to convey the fact that he or she engages in, attempts to engage in, or has a propensity to engage in homosexual acts; or (c) A reliable person states that he or she observed behavior that amounts to a nonverbal statement by a member that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual; i.e., behavior that a reasonable person would believe was intended to convey the statement that the member engages in, attempts to engage in, or has a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts. 
Id. (internal numbering simplified

B. Law Schools Object to Discrimination
Law school members of FAIR did not want military recruiters on their campuses for two reasons. First, the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy discriminates against gays. Second, law schools that are members of the AALS have a policy of excluding employers that cannot commit to hiring their students on a non-discriminatory basis. 24 The issue in FAIR was not that the law schools wanted to change the discriminatory policies of the military. Rather, the law schools simply argued that the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy forced them to house military recruiters in violation of their AALS non-discrimination policies and thus violated their First Amendment rights to expressive association. 25 To become a member of the AALS, each law school must pay a membership fee and show that it is able to comply with the requirements of membership. 26 The current core values of membership include scholarship, academic freedom, diversity of viewpoints, and the selection of a student body based on intellectual ability and personal potential "through a fair and non-discriminatory process designed to produce a diverse student body and a broadly rep- 26 Ass'N OF AM. LAw SCH., supra note 5, at 26 (AALS Bylaws § 2-2).
(a) Applications for membership shall be addressed to the Executive Director accompanied by evidence that the applicant has fulfilled and is capable in the future of fulfilling the obligations of membership as reflected in these bylaws (including the requiremehts and approved policies they embody), and the regulations promulgating thereunder. The Executive Committee shall examine the application and report at the Annual Meeting of the Association whether or not the applicant has qualified. The application for membership shall be filed at the time and in the form specified by the Executive Committee. (b) In determining whether a school fulfills and can continue to fulfill the obligations of membership, the controlling issue is the overall quality of the school measured against the standards of quality articulated in the Requirements of Article 6. The statements of Approved Association Policy and the Regulations are designed to provide guidance in making this assessment. They are not meant to be taken as implying that formal compliance with their specific terms is necessarily equivalent to satisfaction of the qualitative requirements, or that departure from any of their specific terms is automatically demonstrative of qualitative failure. (c) A law school making application for membership shall pay to the Association an application fee to defray the indirect expenses of the Association in an amount established by the Executive Committee and such direct expenses incurred in connection with the application as are specified by the Executive Committee.
resentative legal profession." 2 7 Most pertinent to this case is the AALS's strict non-discrimination policy regarding admission and treatment of both students and graduates in creating an equal opportunity to obtain employment. All AALS member schools must ensure that their students will not be discriminated against by employers on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation. 28 The AALS non-discrimination bylaws further state: "A member school shall communicate to each employer to whom it furnishes assistance and facilities for interviewing and other placement functions the school's firm expectation that the employer will observe the principle of equal opportunity.
To ensure law schools comply with this agreement, the AALS requires employers that recruit at law schools to provide a written agreement that they do not discriminate on the basis of any of the grounds prohibited by the AALS. 3°2 7 Id. at 33 (AALS Bylaws § 6-1).
(b) The Association values and expects its member schools to value: (i) a faculty composed primarily of full-time teachers/scholars who constitute a self-governing intellectual community engaged in the creation and dissemination of knowledge about law, legal processes, and legal systems, and who are devoted to fostering justice and public service in the legal community; (ii) scholarship, academic freedom, and diversity of viewpoints; (iii) a rigorous academic program built upon strong teaching in the context of a dynamic curriculum that is both broad and deep; (iv) a diverse faculty and staff hired, promoted, and retained based on meeting and supporting high standards of teaching and scholarship and in accordance with principles of non-discrimination; and (v) selection of students based upon intellectual ability and personal potential for success in the study and practice of law, though a fair and nondiscriminatory process designed to produce a diverse student body and a broadly representative legal profession.
Id.
28 Id. at 34 (AALS Bylaws § 6-3(b)). "A member school shall pursue a policy of providing its students and graduates with equal opportunity to obtain employment, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation." Id. The AALS elected to include sexual orientation as a protected class in its non-discrimination policies in 1990 by a unanimous vote of its House of Representatives. A member school shall inform employers of its obligation under Bylaw 6-4(b), and shall require employers, as a condition of obtaining any form of placement assistance or use of the school's facilities, to provide
The AALS currently has 166 members, meaning virtually every law school in the country includes sexual orientation as a protected class in its non-discrimination policies. 3 Further, the AALS has strongly opposed military recruitment on law school campuses because of the military's administrative ban on homosexual servicemembers.
3 2 The AALS initially barred military recruiters from recruiting on law school campuses. This action provoked a backlash from many conservative members of Congress and led to passage of the Solomon Amendment.
3 " Thus, when Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment, law schools were forced to choose between complying with the policy of the AALS by not allowing military recruiters on their campuses and risking the loss of federal funding or complying with the Solomon Amendment and risking disassociation with the AALS.
C. The Solomon Amendment: Congress Strikes Back
The Solomon Amendment penalizes institutions of higher education for not providing military recruiters 3 4 with access that is an assurance of the employer's willingness to observe the principles of equal opportunity stated in Bylaw 6-4(b). A member school has a further obligation to investigate any complaints concerning discriminatory practices against its students to assure that placement assistance and facilities are made available only to employers whose practices are consistent with the principles of equal opportunity stated in Bylaw 6-4(b).
Id.
31 Ass'N OF Am. LAw SCH., supra note 5, at 1 (out of 187 ABA-accredited law schools nationwide, 166 are AALS members). Sept. 20, 2006) . In addition, applicants must be United States citizens between the ages of 21 and 42, must be physically fit and meet the Army weight standards, and must also "possess a high moral character and leadership potential," as well as other admission requirements for military service such as compliance with the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Id. Fi-"equal in quality and scope" to that which other employers are provided by discontinuing all federal funding from the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy; and the Departments of Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Labor, and Transportation; and under the Related Agencies Appropriations Act 5 The Solomon Amendment was a response to the decisions of many educational institutions to exclude military recruiters from their campuses in the early nineties because of the military's historical commitment to institutionalized homophobia. Only twenty days after the highly politicized New York Court of Appeals decision in Lloyd v. Grella, 3 6 U.S. Representative Gerald Solomon 3 7 introduced the Solomon Amendment to the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act." In the debates on the House floor that followed, it was clear that the bill stemmed from a perceived, rather than actual, negative effect of universities' non-discrimination policies on military recruitment. 3 More specifically, the bill was nally, before entering active duty, each officer must be a graduate of an ABA-approved law school and a member in good standing of the bar. Finally, the Department of Defense opposed the Solomon Amendment because existing legislation 4 " already allowed the Department to discontinue funding to educational institutions that deny military recruiters for non-discrimination reasons, the key difference being that the Department could make an exception if discontinuing funding would harm military research. 4 9 Nonetheless, the Amendment was approved by a vote of 271 to 12650 and went into effect in 1996.51 Since then, the law has been amended several times. The original version only denied funding from the Department of Defense for schools that had policies preventing military recruiters' entry to campuses or access to students and student directory information. 5 shall not apply to a covered educational entity if the Secretary of Defense determines that -(1) the covered educational entity has ceased the policy or practice described in such subsection; or (2) the institution of higher education involved has a longstanding policy of pacifism based on historical religious affiliation. 2)).
During the current fiscal year and hereafter, any Federal grant of funds to an institution of higher education to be available solely for student financial assistance or related administrative costs may be used for the purpose which the grant was made without regard to any provision to Before 2001, universities and colleges permitted military recruiters access to their campuses in accordance with the Solomon Amendment, but many only allowed the military recruiters to conduct interviews in offices other than career services, such as the office of ROTC studies. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, however, the Department of Defense adopted an informal policy that required military recruiters to have access and treatment equal to that afforded to other employers. 5 8 The Department of Defense communicated this to schools it felt were in violation of the Solomon Amendment in warning letters. 5 9 During the course of FAJR's appeal, both of these informal regulations were codified in the 2005 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act.
6 " Now, under the latest version of the Solomon Amendment, subelements (such as law schools) and their parent institutions are penalized for preventing military recruiters on their campuses "in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer." 6 ' In addition, the latest version of the Solo- (b) No funds described in subsection (d) (1) may be provided by contract or by a grant to an institution of higher education (including any subelement of such institution) if the Secretary of Defense determines that the institution (or any subelement of that institution) has a policy or practice (regardless of when implemented) that either prohibits, or in effect prevents -(1) the Secretary of a military department or Secretary of Homeland Security from gaining access to campuses, or access to students (who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for purposes of military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided in any other employer; or (2) access by military recruiters for purposes of military recruiting to the following information pertaining to students (who are 17 years of age or older) enrolled at that institution (or any subelement of that institution): (A) Names, addresses, and telephone listings.
(B) Date and place of birth, levels of education, academic majors, de-mon Amendment targets funding from a broader array of federal departments. 6 2 Thus, law schools are now required to provide equal treatment to recruiters as they would to any other employer, and the stakes for not doing so have been raised considerably.
63
Based on the coercive effects of the Department of Defense's recent amendments to the Solomon Amendment, the AALS was forced to change its non-discrimination policy to create an exception for military recruitment in exchange for ameliorative efforts by the law schools. 6 4 The AALS made its opposition to the Sologrees received, and the most recent educational institution enrolled in by the student. (2) Any Federal funding specified in paragraph (1) that is provided in an institution of higher education, or to an individual, to be available solely for student financial assistance, related administrative costs, or costs associated with attendance, may be used for the purpose for which the funding is provided.
Id.
63 See Memorandum from Robert C. Clark, supra note 1. Harvard Law School's policy change is a salient example of the dilemma faced by law schools as a result of the most recent amendment. The Law School itself only receives a minimal amount of federal funding, but its parent institution, Harvard University, receives approximately $323 million from the federal government, comprising 16% of its operating budget. Id. Therefore, after 1999, the Department of Defense regulations pursuant to the Solomon Amendment would penalize both Harvard Law School and Harvard University for failure to comply with the amendment, even if the Law School was the only subelement of the University to deny military recruitment on its campus. , http://www.aals.org/deansmemos/00-2.html. The ameliorative efforts on the part of law schools require that every AALS member's students are informed each year that the military discriminates on a basis that is not permitted by either the school or the AALS's commitment to non-discrimination and that the military is only being allowed to conduct interviews because of the threat of loss of funds. Id. The AALS offers many suggestions of proactive ameliorative acts such as forums and panels to discuss the military's policy, support of student-led protests, and sending sexual minorities to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered (LGBT)-specific
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6 5 In that case, the law schools asserted that the Solomon Amendment violated their right to expressive association, their freedom from governmentcompelled speech, and their right to expressive conduct. The Supreme Court did not agree.
II. THE CASE: FROM THE DISTRICT COURT TO THE SUPREME COURT
In their complaint filed September 2003 in the United States District Court of New Jersey, the named plaintiffs-FAIR; 6 6 the Sonetworking events. Id. The AALS then evaluates the ameliorative acts taken by each law school and balances them with the school's other efforts to support a hospitable environment such as whether there is an LGBT student organization or there are openly lesbian and gay faculty and staff present. Id. Further, the ameliorative efforts also require that law schools show that they did not simply perform ad hoc activities, rely on the students to supply student-driven activities, or only perform proforma activities that would be unlikely to have a significant impact on the environment of the law school. Id. (emphasis in original). It should be noted that this is a clear-cut way in which the Solomon Amendment has interfered with the message of law schools as well as the law schools' policies. See FELDBLUM & BOUCAJ, supra note 33, at 7.
65 AALS Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 1. Only rarely does the AALS seek to become involved in litigation as amicus curiae, and then only in matters involving issues with far-reaching impact on fundamental aspects of legal education. The issue presented in this case is, without question, such an issue. AALS is deeply troubled by the provisions of federal law challenged here, which conflict with the core values of AALS policy and the nondiscrimination obligations of AALS member law schools.
Id.
66 FAIR is an association of law schools, law faculties, and other academic institutions who vote by majority to join. FAIR's mission is "to promote academic freedom, support educational institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate the rights of institutions of higher education. 275 . To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish "(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm absent the injunction, (3) that the harm absent the injunction outweighs the harm to the Government of granting it, and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest." FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F. 73 FA!R 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275. FAIR's standing was contested by the government originally. Id. at 284. The main standing concern was that FAIR's membership had been kept secret due to fear of retaliation, but after several law schools were willing to be publicly named, the district court granted standing. Id. at 289. The court also held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their other claims of viewpoint discrimination and unconstitutional vagueness, an issue that became moot when, dur-appeal, the Third Circuit reversed on three grounds. First, it found that the law schools were "expressive associations" whose First Amendment right to disseminate their chosen message was impaired by being financially forced to include military recruiters on their campuses." 4 Second, it held that the law schools' right to free speech was violated when the schools were compelled to assist military recruiters. 7 5 Finally, it held that FAIR should also prevail under the less strict framework of the O'Brien expressive conduct test. 76 The following sections describe the district and circuit courts' differing approaches to the relevant doctrine.
A. The Dale Test for Expressive Association
Both courts analyzed FAIR's claim under the doctrine of expressive association, applying the three-part analysis from Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 7 7 which considers whether the group making the claim is engaged in expressive association; whether the governmental action at issue significantly affected the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints; and whether the government's interest justifies the burden imposed on the group's associational expression. 7 8
The district court recognized that a group only has to engage in some form of expression to be considered an expressive association; therefore, plaintiffs claiming a violation of the right to expressive association are essentially given the benefit of the doubt regarding the first prong of the Dale analysis. 79 It found that because the schools had adopted "official policies with respect to sexual orientation," they qualified as expressive associations. 8 " The circuit court agreed that law schools are expressive associations. 8 ' ing the appeal, the Department of Defense codified its vague informal policies so that law schools now have to assist military recruiters in a "manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer." FAIR, 390 F.3d at 228 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 983(b)). 74 80 Id. at 304. 81 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 231. Before discussing the merits of the case, the court discussed the applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which FAIR raised in its brief. Put simply, under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the However, the district and circuit courts differed in their applications of the second and third prongs of the Dale expressive association analysis: whether the governmental action at issue significantly affected the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints, and whether the government's interestjustifies the burden imposed on the group's associational expression.
The district court reasoned that a state anti-discrimination law in Dale would have forced the Boy Scouts to accept a gay rights activist notjust as a member, but as an assistant scoutmaster. 82 The Solomon Amendment, however, does not force law schools to make the military recruiters members; instead, they are merely "periodic visitors." 3 Further, the "ameliorative efforts" provision that the AALS adopted to combat the Solomon Amendment made it clear to members of the association that the military are not members of the law school; their message is not included in the association's message; and the association outright disagrees with the military. 8 4 Thus, the district court found that the government's actions did not significantly affect the group's ability to promote its viewpoint.
The circuit court did not agree and held that the Solomon Amendment significantly affected the law schools' ability to express their viewpoint that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong. 5 It reasoned that in Dale, the Court interpreted "siggovernment "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes on his constitutionally protected interests-especially his interest in freedom of speech." Id. at 229 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) Because the circuit court found that the Solomon Amendment "substantially affects" the law schools' ability to express their viewpoint, it found that the government's interest did not justify the burden imposed on the group's associational expression under the Dale strict scrutiny analysis. 9° The court presumed that the government had a compelling interest in the recruitment of talented military lawyers but held that the Solomon Amendment is tailored too broadly. The court reasoned that the military has many alternative means of recruitment, some of which might be more beneficial, citing as examples loan repayment programs or television and radio ads. 9 ' The court added that the government "failed to offer a shred of evidence that the Solomon Amendment materially enhances its stated goal" 9 2 and that the military might actually be harmed by the negativity around JAG recruitment at law schools due to the Amendment itself. 9 " Thus, the court held that the means chosen were not narrowly tailored to achieve the government's compelling interest.
94
B. Compelled Speech
The plaintiffs also argued that the Solomon Amendment unconstitutionally compelled their speech. The Supreme Court has found three categories of compelled speech to be unconstitutional: [Vol. 10:199 government action that forces a private speaker to propagate a particular message chosen by a government; 95 government action that forces a private speaker to accommodate or include another private speaker's message; 9 6 and government action that forces an individual to subsidize or contribute to an organization that engages in speech the individual opposes. 9 7 FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment requires compliance with all three of these forms of compelled speech. 9 "
The district court, relying heavily on Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 99 found that there is nothing in the Solomon Amendment that requires law schools to speak on behalf of the military's recruiters, at least not in the "linguistic or verbal sense." 10 0 In Hurley, the Supreme Court held that a local anti-discrimination ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to forcing Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade to include a gay, lesbian, and bisexual (GLIB) contingent. The district court in FAIR reasoned that while in Hurley the GLIB organization's purpose was to march in the parade "in order to express as a message its members' pride as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals of Irish heritage,"'' the military recruiters in FAIR are "not seeking access to campuses and students with the primary purpose of expressing the message that disapproval of openly gay conduct within the armed forces is morally correct or justifiable.' 0 1 2 In addition, since law schools are able to disclaim the military's message as not their own, the court found that the Solomon Amendment does not compel speech. 103 The circuit court, on the other hand, held that the Solomon Amendment compels law schools to propagate, accommodate, and subsidize the military's expressive message.' 0 4 It found that recruiting is expression because oral and written communication are involved, such as "published and posted announcements of the The circuit court found that even if the recruiters did not put forth an express message, their presence conveyed the message that "our organization is worth working for."'°6 Rather, the law schools, not the government, should assess the value of the information presented 10 7 since "protection of speech is not limited to clear-cut propositions subject to assent or contradiction, but covers a broader sphere of expressive preference." ' ' By mandating that law schools distribute newsletters and post notices for the recruiters, the court found that the Solomon Amendment requires law schools to "propagate the military's message. ' O° Because schools have to arrange interviews and recruiting functions for the military recruiters, the Solomon Amendment forces law schools to accommodate the military's message. 1° Finally, since the Solomon Amendment effectively puts demands on the law schools' employees and resources, the schools are compelled to subsidize the military's message. 11 1 Further, the circuit court took issue with the district court for its use of the disclaimer as a legitimate means of showing that the law schools do not obviously endorse the military's message, stating "the Solomon Amendment, as recently amended, does not appear to permit law schools to disclaim the military's message." 1 12 The court reasoned that there is no precedent in compelled speech doctrine that the making of a disclaimer lessens the constitutional violation, 3 
C. The O'Brien Test for Expressive Conduct
Because the district court found that there was only an "incidental limitation" on the right to free expression, it applied the intermediate scrutiny test for expressive conduct as derived from United States v. O'Brien instead of the Dale strict scrutiny test.' 15 The circuit court clarified the definition of expressive conduct as "some activity, though it is not speech proper and is not protected under other First Amendment grounds, [that] is crucial to public debate and warrants protection."'" 6 Expressive conduct is essentially an umbrella doctrine for protected First Amendment rights that do not fit into the other sections of the doctrine. 1 17 A government regulation impairing expressive conduct is justified "if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.""' Under this test, the district court concluded that the Solomon Amendment is within Congress's constitutional power to raise and support a military" 9 and furthers the important governmental interest of ensuring the effectiveness of a volunteer military through intensive recruiting to obtain enlistments.
1 20 The court found that these interests were not only important, they were compelling.' 2 1
Further, the district court determined that the governmental interest in raising and supporting a military is unrelated to the freedom of expression. It cited O'Brien to reject plaintiffs' claim that the pressure . . . to respond to [compelled] speech"); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255-58 (1974) (noting that there was no suggestion by the court that an ability to disclaim would have changed the fact that there was impermissible compelled speech); and Wooley, 430 U.S. at 722 (state law was still compelled speech even though there was nothing that precluded car owners from displaying their disagreement with the state motto)). 114 Id. purpose behind the Solomon Amendment was the suppression of ideas, stating that it "is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.' 2 2 Finally, it found that the Amendment's incidental restriction on expression is "no greater than is essential... so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' ' 2 ' The court then exclusively relied on the fact that recruitment is the chief method of connecting law students with employers. 124 The court also made it clear that law schools are not required to offer their campuses for military recruiters and are free to reject the federal funding. Thus, the district court held that the Solomon Amendment does not unconstitutionally restrain the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
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The circuit court also applied the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny test for expressive conduct, but it found that the Solomon Amendment would not survive even a lower level of scrutiny if it were applicable.' 27 The circuit court assumed, arguendo, that the district court was correct in finding that the Solomon Amendment was unrelated to the suppression of ideas and presumed that the United States had a vital interest in having a system for acquiring talented military lawyers. 128 However, the court noted that the government did not submit any evidence that the Solomon Amendment actually furthers a compelling government interest. 29 Instead, the military argued that the idea that inclusion of military recruiters furthers this interest is "self-evident" and based on "common sense."' l3 The circuit court made it clear that there is no precedent of "common sense" to justify a violation of First Amendment rights, pointing out that the Department of Defense was initially opposed to the Solomon Amendment because its 122 
D. The Supreme Court Opinion
On March 6, 2006, the Supreme Court unanimously 133 reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment."' In one of the first opinions by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court used an unprecedented analysis to reach its conclusion and left no part of the Third Circuit opinion intact. First, it determined whether the Solomon Amendment actually forces law schools to include military recruiters. 135 Then, the Court applied select First Amendment doctrine to the Solomon Amendment, but prefaced its analysis with a reminder of Congress's Article I power to "raise and support Armies" and to "provide and maintain a Navy." 13 6 It found that military recruiting does not compel speech and that law schools are free to speak out against the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. 137 Next, the Court distinguished the Solomon Amendment from expressive conduct doctrine and spared it from the O'Brien analysis. 13 1 In lieu of an expressive conduct analysis, it applied a more relaxed standard of review to the already lower standard presented by O'Brien.' 3 9 Finally, the Court reasoned that the Solomon Amendment does not infringe on law schools' right to expressive association. 140 Chief Justice Roberts opened the opinion by accepting the The Supreme Court did not mention the other portion of the reasoning the Third Circuit used to reach its conclusion, specifically, the doctrines of expressive association 146 and compelled speech.
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The first issue that the Court addressed is what the Solomon Amendment requires of law schools.' 48 Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of this analysis is that the Court conceded that the government and FAIR agreed on the meaning of the statute:' 49 The statute's meaning, plainly stated, is that "[i]n order for a law school and its university to receive federal funding, the law school must offer military recruiters the same access to its campus and students that it provides to the nonmilitary recruiter receiving the most favorable access." 1 The Court concluded that the statute requires the Secretary of Defense to compare the military's "access to campuses" and "access to students" to "the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer." ' 1 5 ' Because the congressional record clearly supported the interpretation that the Amendment focuses on the result of a school's recruiting policy rather than its content, the Court concluded that the government and FAIR correctly interpreted the meaning of the Solomon Amendment. 1 52 Next, the Court analyzed the significance ofjudicial deference on military issues. The Court made it clear that the statute is an exercise of Congress's Article I power to "provide for the common defence" and to "raise and support Armies."' 53 It argued that this case was about the "broad and sweeping" authority to require access to campuses for the purpose of military recruiting. 5 4 Relying on Rostker v. Goldberg, 15 5 the Court stated that although Congress can exceed its military authority and violate the First Amendment, the purpose of the legislation must be considered when determining its constitutionality. 5 1 Quoting Rostker, the Court stated that 'judicial deference . . . is at its apogee" when Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support its armies. 5 7 While Congress could have legislated directly to mandate recruiting, the Court noted that Congress chose to impose military recruitment indirectly through its Spending Clause power. 5 173 the Court reasoned that it is not a violation of free speech to make some sort of conduct illegal "merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either written, spoken, or printed." 7 4 The Court analogized to a law prohibiting employers from discriminating in employment on the basis of race, reasoning that such a law would only incidentally require the employer to remove a sign that read "White Applicants Only" and therefore would not compel the employer's speech. to support this distinction. However, the Court also distinguished FAIR from this line of precedent, concluding that "the compelled-speech violation in each of our prior cases... resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker's own message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate." ' First, the Court reasoned that Hurley, which held that a state law forcing a parade to include lesbian and gay marchers violated the First Amendment, was fundamentally about the expressive nature of the parade and the right of a speaker to determine the content of his message.' 8 2 Next, the Court argued that its holdings in Miami Herald and Pacific Gas covered cases where compelled speech interfered with the speakers' desired message by, respectively, compelling a newspaper to print a reply and allowing a utility company to include its newsletter in its billing envelopes.
8 3 The Supreme Court maintained, however, that accommodating the military's speech as the Solomon Amendment requires does not affect the law school's speech because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.
8 4 The Court stated, "Unlike a parade organizer's choice of parade contingents, a law school's decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive." ' 1 8 Further, "accommodation of a military recruiter's message is not compelled speech because the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any message of the school."' 8 1 6 The Court invoked PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins' 8 7 to reject the law schools' argument that, as a result of the Solomon Amendment, they could be viewed as sending the message that they agree with the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.1 8 8 The Court explained that, in PruneYard, it had upheld a state law that required a shopping center owner to allow "certain expressive activities by others on his property" because it was unlikely that the owner of the shopping center would be associated with those engaging in expressive activities; he was free to disassociate himself from those views.' 8 9 The Court also cited Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 19° which held that a federal law requiring high schools to allow student religious groups did not violate the Establishment Clause because the high school students could appreciate the difference between speech sponsored by the school and speech that the school must allow under law but to which it does not subscribe.' 9 1 The Court reasoned that if high school students can tell the difference between their school's speech and students' speech, then "surely students have not lost that ability by the time they get to law school."' 9 2 The Court concluded that because FAIR was not restricted from speaking out against the military's policies, the law schools could not claim that their message would be confused with the military's message. 1
93
In the final section of the case, the Court considered the expressive conduct argument and briefly addressed expressive association. First, the Court noted that in deciding O'Brien, it did not hold that conduct can be labeled as protected "speech" whenever the person engaging in conduct is intending to express an idea.' 94 Instead, in the subsequent decision of Texas v. Johnson, 1 9 5 the Court clarified that First Amendment protection only attaches to conduct that is "inherently expressive." ' 1 96 Applying this rule to FAIR, the Court reasoned, "The expressive component of a law school's actions is not created by the conduct itself but by the speech that accompanies it." ' 
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The Court further argued that the Third Circuit erred when it held that the Solomon Amendment did not pass constitutional muster under O'Brien because the government failed to show how the Solomon Amendment was tailored in any way to further the government's interest."' 8 Quoting United States v. Albertini, 9 9 the Court stated that "an incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible under O'Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. ' In the last few paragraphs of the opinion, the Court addressed the doctrine of expressive association. The Court first reviewed the holding in Dale. 2 4 Next, the Court stated, "The Solomon Amendment, however, does not similarly affect a law school's associational rights." 2°5 The Court's main distinction was that, unlike in Dale, the law schools are not forced to include the recruiters as part of their group. 2°6 Instead, it argued that the recruiters are by definition outsiders who come to campus with the limited purpose of hiring students. 2°7 (2000)). Dale found a non-discrimination law unconstitutional because the Boy Scouts of America was an expressive association and forcing it to include an openly gay scoutmaster would significantly affect its ability to advocate its viewpoints; the state's interest did notjustify the burden it imposed on the group's expressive association. Dale, 530 U.S. at 656. 25 FA!R, 126 S. Ct. at 1312.
Jaycees, 2°s the Court said that a speaker cannot "erect a shield" against laws requiring access "simply by asserting" that mere association "would impair its message. ' 2°9 Further, the Court confirmed that the Solomon Amendment does not have a similar effect to the non-discrimination law in Dale because "[s] tudents and faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of the military's message .... "210 Thus, the Court concluded that "[a] military recruiter's mere presence on campus does not violate a law school's right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school considers the recruiter's message. ' "21 For these reasons, the Court concluded that the Third Circuit incorrectly held the Solomon Amendment unconstitutional. It therefore reversed its judgment granting a preliminary injunction and remanded the case. The Supreme Court's opinion in FAR, one of the first opinions written by ChiefJustice John Roberts, sounds good despite numerous flaws in the Court's reasoning and use of caselaw. It flows well and seems concise and logical-if the reader is not familiar with the applicable doctrine. Once one becomes acquainted with First Amendment doctrine, it becomes clear very quickly that the Court has quietly brushed aside important precedent and relied instead on irrelevant and dormant cases. In the end, rather than applaud the Court for its skilled legal reasoning, the reader should wonder why not even one single judge dissented in indignation. This final section of this Note will take a closer look at flaws in the Supreme Court's opinion in FAIR
A. Irrelevant and Outdated Caselaw
In the beginning of its analysis, the Court discussed the "broad and sweeping" authority of Congress to raise and support the military, a power expressly granted by the Constitution. tions even with legislation involving the military, "the fact that legislation that raises armies is subject to the First Amendment constraints does not mean that we ignore the purpose of this legislation when determining its constitutionality." 2 5
It is nothing less than misleading that the Court used Rostker for its analysis of First Amendment rights under Congress' military powers because Rostker did not address the First Amendment at all. In Rostker, the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the Military Selective Service Act "violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in authorizing the President to require the registration of males and not females." 2 " 6 The issue arose after President Carter briefly reinstated the draft in early 1980, but Congress only allocated enough funding to register males. 21 v Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that even though Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause when acting in the area of military affairs, the statute was constitutional. 218 The Court reasoned that since women were not eligible for combat, not registering women for the draft was closely related to the government interest of efficiency. 219 While Rostker discussed Congress' power in relation to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it neither rested on First Amendment doctrine nor created First Amendment precedent.
Further, in the discussion of military power and funding conditions in FAIR, the Court also relied on Grove City College v. Bell, 220 which "rejected a private college's claim that conditioning federal funds on its compliance with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 violated the First Amendment." 221 The Grove City College Court reasoned that "Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept. ' The use of Grove City College reflects the Court's disingenuous analysis and discount of the magnitude of the federal funding at stake for law schools and their parent institutions. In Grove City College, a private college refused to execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX, 2 2 4 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity that receives federal financial assistance. 225 First, the Court asked whether Title IX applied to Grove City College since the college did not accept any direct assistance but enrolled students who received federal grants for education purposes. 226 The Court held that the financial assistance received by Grove City students was included in the government aid money under Title IX. Next, it asked whether federal financial assistance to students could be terminated because the College refused to assure compliance with Tide IX. 2 28 In its analysis, the Court made clear that "the economic effect of student aid is far different from the effect of non-earmarked grants to institutions themselves since the former, unlike the latter, increases both an institution's resources and its obligations.
' 229 The Court ultimately concluded that the government may condition federal financial student assistance on the assurance that the institution will conduct the aid program or activity in accordance with Title IX. 23°T hird, the Court asked whether the application of Title IX to Grove City College infringed on the First Amendment rights of either the College or its students. 2 31 It is from this section that Chief Justice Roberts extracted the language used in FAIR The First Amendment section of the analysis in Grove City College is only one paragraph long and the Court simply concluded that by requiring Grove City College to comply with Title IX as a condition for student assistance, the federal government did not impermissibly restrain the First Amendment rights of the College and its students. 23 238 in its discussion of compelled speech. The Court reasoned that the compelled speech to which the plaintiffs point is "plainly incidental" to the Solomon Amendment and its regulation of their conduct. 239 To support this assertion, it quoted Giboney: "It has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."
4 1
Giboney is about the power of a state to apply its anti-trade restraint law to labor union activities. Specifically, an ice and coal drivers' union sought better wage and working conditions for their 233 Id. 234 Giboney has very little to do with compelled speech. The use of this case to support the conclusion that the government-compelled speech caused by the Solomon Amendment is "plainly incidental" is not only unclear-because the case does not discuss compelled speech-but is also insincere because the case has very little precedential value on this subject.
Justice Roberts's next ruse was his use of PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins 2 44 to support the assertion that the law schools' compliance with the Solomon Amendment will not send the message that they agree with the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. 24 
5
Roberts reasoned that the Court rejected a similar argument in PruneYard, where it upheld a law protecting "certain expressive activities" at a shopping center because there was little likelihood that the views of "those engaged in the expressive conduct would be identified with the owner" and that the shopping center's owner "remained free to disassociate himself from those views. " 246 PruneYard was a privately owned shopping center in California that had a policy to exclude anyone engaged "in any publicly expressive activity, including the circulating of petitions, that is not directly related to . . . commercial purposes." ' 2 4 7 The issue in this case was whether the owner could constitutionally exclude from his property a group of high school students who set up a card table, distributed pamphlets, and asked people to sign a petition opposing a United Nations resolution. 24 The PruneYard Court distinguished Barnette and Wooley, the compelled speech cases that struck down laws requiring schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and New Hampshire motorists to display "Live Free or Die" on their license plates, respectively. Unlike in Wooley, the government in PruneYard was not requiring a message to be displayed on private property. 25 0 Because the state was not involved in the message, and because the views expressed were those of members of the public who could enter the property at any time, the Court reasoned that PruneYard could simply post signs in the area where the speakers and handbillers stood that separated PruneYard from their message. 251 The PruneYard Court distinguished Barnette because PruneYard was not compelled by the government to recite a political government message word-for-word with a signed acceptance, as in Barnette. 25 2 PruneYards holding fundamentally rested on the fact that the students, who were argued to have compelled the speech of the property owner, were not government actors. In FAIR, that is certainly not the case.
The Supreme Court's decision in FAIR ignored the subsequent precedent that discussed PruneYard. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 25 for example, the Supreme Court held that when the California Public Utilities Commission ordered Pacific Gas to place a third party's newsletter in its billing envelopes, it unconstitutionally forced Pacific Gas to alter its speech. 2 5 4 What the FAIR Court did not disclose in its opinion is that Pacific Gas specifically distinguished PruneYard in its reasoning. 2 55 Pacfic Gas observed that "notably absent from PruneYard was any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center owner's exercise of his right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets; nor was the access right content-based." ' 2 5 6 The Court in Pacfic Gas While the Court in Albertini applied the O'Brien test and weighed in favor of the military, there are several key reasons why it did so and why Albertini is vastly different from FAIR First, the Albertini Court made it clear that the critical fact of the case was that Albertini had previously destroyed military documents and was entering the same military base again after being ordered not to do so. The Court reasoned that "there is no generalized constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets on military bases, even if they are generally open to the public. Further, the content-neutral analysis rested on the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 1382 "serves a significant Government interest by barring entry to a military base by persons whose previous conduct demonstrates that they are a threat to security.
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FAIR was significantly different from Albertini. FAIR did not involve anything like a direct national security threat on military bases. Rather, the compelled speech in FAIR was a government mandate that law schools either disregard their non-discrimination policies and allow the military to recruit on their campuses or lose badly needed federal funding. Further, the government in FAIR did not offer a shred of evidence showing that the Solomon Amendment was even rationally related to an important government interest. Instead, it argued that the relationship between the Amendment and the need to "raise and support armies" was common sense.
2 69 In Albertini, the government interest was national security, and the means chosen were to ban those like Albertini who had already breached national security from military bases unless they obtained written permission to reenter. 
B. Minimized Precedent
In FAIR's troubled procedural history, the district court, the dissenting circuit court judge, and the Supreme Court found that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale did not apply in this case. The district court found that one of the key differences between Dale and FAIR was that the Solomon Amendment did not require FAIR to accept military recruiters as members of their law schools, but simply as "periodic visitor [s] ."271 The Supreme Court supported this assertion by reasoning that recruiters are "outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students-not to become members of the school's expressive association.
' 27 2 As outlined below, there is nothing in Dale to indicate that the precedent it set would not apply to the law schools.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale articulated a new test for determining when a group's right to expressive association has been violated.
27 3 First, the court "must determine whether the group engages in expressive association.
2 74 Second, the court must decide whether the government's mandate to allow the offensive person within the association would significantly burden the association's message or speech. 27 5 Finally, the court must weigh this burden against the government interest. James Dale joined the Boy Scouts as a small child in 1978 and achieved the rank of Eagle Scout in 1988, one of the Scouts' highest honors. 2 7 7 Dale was then granted adult membership in the Boy Scouts and went to college. 2 7 8 While attending college, he came out as gay and attended several seminars about the psychological and health needs of gay and lesbian teens. 279 In 1990, he appeared in the local newspaper identified as the co-president of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance. 2 8° Shortly thereafter, Dale received a letter from the Boy Scouts revoking his adult membership. 2 81 He was later told that his membership was rescinded because the Boy Scouts "forbid [s] membership to homosexuals. ' 28 2 Claiming violation of New Jersey's public accommodations laws, Dale commenced legal action against the Boy Scouts. 283 The Supreme Court held that the New Jersey law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations could not compel the Boy Scouts to include Dale in their association because doing so would violate their right to expressive association. 284 Contrary to the district court's claims, Dale does not limit expressive association to situations where a group is forced to include someone as a member. Surely no one is asserting that the military recruiters seek to become members of the law school communities; after all, their recruitment visits are only periodic. Rather, FAIR asserts that military presence on their campuses diminishes their ability to express their commitment to non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
The reasoning in Dale fully supports FAIR's claim because it does not require that expressive association apply only when an organization is forced to include someone whose speech conflicts with their message; rather it supports the notion that the mere presence of a speaker with an antithetical message is enough. 28 5 The Dale Court asserted that "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.
' 28 6 In addition, the Court in Dale afforded the Boy Scouts deference as to both its expressive message and what would impair that message. 287 Similarly, the view that mere presence interferes with the message of an association was used to exclude the gay, lesbian, and bisexual alliance from marching in Boston' [Vol. 10:199
hind the organization's banner would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals. ' 12 9 Regardless of the reason why the parade organizers did not agree with their message, the Court concluded that "it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control. 29°I n Hurley, the parade organizers did not assert that the nondiscrimination laws would force them to include the GLIB as members of their organization. Rather, they argued that the mere presence of the GLIB suggested that their association agreed with the views that the GLIB represented regarding sexual orientation. 2 9 ' Dale followed this precedent. Thus, the right to expressive association does not rest solely on the freedom from forced membership of persons whose personalities or messages are antithetical to those of the association. The right also restricts the mere presence of persons when that presence suggests an idea or opinion contrary to that held by the expressive organizations. And, as Hurley indicated, the presence need only last a few hours a year, which is often the case of military recruiters on law school campuses.
The Supreme Court addresses both Hurley and Dale minimally in FAIR presumably because, in both cases, gays were the group being excluded rather than the military. 29 2 And, as the Court constantly reminds us, Congress's power in regards to the military is "broad and sweeping." 29 3 Interestingly, the Court also separated Hurley and Dale, as if the precedent they set was unrelated, by not discussing them as a pair with similar facts, rationales, and holdings. 29 4 289 Id. at 574-75 (emphasis added). 290 Id. 291 Id. 292 The contrast of the facts in Dale, Hurley, and FAIR is ironic to say the least. Both Hurley and Dale make room for the exclusion of LGBT people from a parade and the Boy Scouts, respectively, because of the First Amendment rights of those seeking to exclude LGBTs from their spaces of expression. On the other hand, the Court's holding in FAIR finds it impermissible for law schools to exclude the military from physically entering their campuses for recruiting purposes, and thus, from entering their spaces of expression. Of course, the reason FAIR seeks to exclude the military is not because they disagree with the military per se; but rather because of the military's policy that discriminates against LGBTs. The Court's lack of analysis of Hurley and Dale is troubling. These two cases represented some of the most recent precedent pertaining to the same issues faced by FAIR. However, by choosing to discuss neither case in full nor together, the Court was able to insinuate that they are inapplicable.
IV. THE (RELATIVELY) BRIGHT SIDE
The Solomon Amendment at its inception was driven by animus towards political activism by institutions of higher education against the military's discriminatory policies. Gerald Solomon himself stood on the House floor and introduced the bill by saying, "We can begin today by telling recipients of Federal money at colleges and universities that if you do not like the Armed Forces, if you do not like its policies . . . do not expect Federal dollars to support your interference with our military recruiters." 29 9 Thus, it was clear from the beginning that the real problem sparking the Solomon Amendment was not a lack of sufficient military recruiting on campuses, especially because the Department of Defense did not support the bill when it was first introduced for fear of the negative effects on research. 3 0 0 Rather, the Solomon Amendment was born with the purpose of silencing dissent from universities and their members regarding discriminatory military policies. Since the Amendment's inception, organizations like the AALS have come up with "ameliorative efforts" to protest JAG's presence on their campuses without actually restricting JAG from entering. 30 However, after the 2005 revision to the Solomon Amendment was passed-mandating that schools provide military recruiters with access to their campuses "in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer" at the risk of both law schools and their parent institutions of losing millions of federal dollars 3 02 -many were concerned that even "ameliorative efforts" such as protests and speakers would be antithetical to the "equal in quality and scope" requirement since other employers did not receive such treatment.
The Supreme Court's decision in FAIR makes it clear that schools will not be penalized under the Solomon Amendment for voicing their opposition to it or military policies. In fact, the Court's opinion rests on the fact that universities are free to dissent in ways other than barring recruiters from their campuses. It reasoned that "students and faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of the military's message," and thus the Solomon Amendment does not violate a law school's First Amendment rights.1 0 3
So, even though FAIR lost the case on all three grounds-the right to expressive association, the freedom from government-compelled speech, and the right to expressive conduct-at least law schools can still loudly and publicly dissent from the military's presence on their campuses. While that right seems paltry in comparison, it is, at least, something.
CONCLUSION: WHAT NEXT?
The Supreme Court's decision in FAIR symbolizes the direction our judicial system is heading with regard to the First Amendment, anti-discrimination laws, and the power of the military. While there is a glimmer of hope in the fact that the Court did not outlaw law schools' ameliorative efforts against the military's policy 
